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1 Introduction 
The future institutional environment for the coexistence of genetically modified 
crops (GM-crops)1, conventional crops and organic crops in Europe combines 
measures of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules. Recognising Europe’s 
heterogeneity in farm structures, crop patterns and legal environments, the 
European Commission decided to follow the principle of subsidiarity and states 
that “measures for coexistence should be developed and implemented by the 
Member States.” (Commission of the European Communities 2003). Member 
States develop a variety of different coexistence rules and regulations (Beckmann, 
Soregaroli, and Wesseler 2006) that may have a profound impact on the adoption 
rate of GM-crops. The discussion on coexistence and the governance of the GM-
technology, however, is not limited to Europe. There is an ongoing debate in the 
United States, Canada, New Zealand and other countries (see e.g. Kershen 2002; 
Smyth, Khachatourians and Phillips 2002; Conner 2003; Falck Zepeda 2006).  
Against this background we ask the following two questions: How does ex-
ante regulation and ex-post liability under irreversibility and uncertainty affect the 
adoption of GM crops? What are the implications for regional agglomeration of 
GM and non-GM crops?  
Our contribution differs from previous studies on the subject that analyse the 
economics of public regulations of biotechnology during the research and 
development phase, such as Larason and Knudson (1991). We consider GM-
technologies that have been approved by the regulatory body, e.g. the European 
Food Safety Agency (EFSA), as being safe for human consumption and the 
environment, if grown according to pre-defined regulations. The present paper 
provides a comprehensive framework for the evaluation of coexistence at the farm 
level, in terms of adoption decision, regional agglomeration, minimum farm size, 
and the consequential effects of policy measures.  
The literature on ex-ante safety regulations versus ex-post liability for harm 
discusses the welfare efficient conditions of using either one or both and assumes 
_________________________ 
1 There is some controversy about the use and meaning of the term genetically modified 
organism. We follow here the definition used by the FAO (Zaid et al. 2001), which defines 
a genetically modified organism as an organism “that has been transformed by the 
insertion of one or more transgenes.” (p. 125), which applies to a single organism such as a 
seed corn or animal. 
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the utility derived from harmful action is sufficiently large (e.g. Shavell 1987; 
Larson 1996; Schmitz, 2000; Boyer and Porrini 2004; Roe, 2004; Calcott and 
Hutton 2006). One of the results from that literature is favouring ex-ante 
regulations in case the injurer is subject to bankruptcy if being held liable. 
We are more interested to discuss the situation where the utility is not 
sufficiently large and the harm causing firms are not subject to bankruptcy. In 
particular, we look at ex-ante regulations versus ex-post liabilities from the point 
of view of how this does effect technology adoption, firm growth and regional 
development. This is an aspect that so far has not been considered in the literature 
on ex-ante regulations versus ex-post liabilities. Further, while the standard 
literature only considers unilateral accidents where injurers can take precautionary 
actions or are forced to take precautionary actions, we allow for responses of the 
victims and bargaining possibilities between injurer and victim. One analysis that 
comes close to our case is Viscusi and Moore (1993). The authors analyse the case 
of product liability on research and development and innovation, where liability 
risks may result in bankruptcy or in extremely high insurance costs. While their 
study considers investment in innovations and considers liability issues only, we 
analyse the case of adoption of innovation and consider ex-ante regulations as well 
as ex-post liability. A combination of ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules 
and implications on adoption has been introduced by Soregaroli and Wesseler 
(2005) and Beckmann et al. (2006). We expand the model by explicitly 
considering transaction costs, which so far has been ignored by other authors 
investigating the relationship between coexistence policies and adoption of GM 
crops and discuss the implications for the comparative advantage of either being a 
GM or non-GM farmer.2 Our results show that ex-ante regulations and ex-post 
liability can induce regional agglomeration of the harm causing firms and can have 
important implications for regional growth as access to technical innovations can 
be hindered or supported by the regulators choice of ex-ante regulations and ex-
post liability rules. While this has been mentioned by Beckmann and Wesseler 
(2007) the role of regulations on the irreversibility effect and in particular the 
relation ship between ex-post liability, transaction costs and the irreversibility 
effect has not been discussed in the relevant literature.  
_________________________ 
2 The GM farm has a comparative advantage in the production of GM crops as it can 
produce that good at a lower opportunity cost relative to the non-GM farm. 
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The effect has been modelled by using a combined geometric Brownian 
motion and Poisson process (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994) applied to problems of 
ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules as in Soregaroli and Wesseler (2005) 
but extended by including transaction costs caused by regulatory policies. Results 
show these further increases the irreversibility effect and the costs of minimum 
distance requirements. 
In more detail, coexistence is assessed under the existence of costs related to 
ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability, the presence of irreversible costs and 
uncertainty, and the consequential comparative advantages of different types of 
farms in becoming GM or non-GM producers. The impact of irreversibility and 
uncertainty on the comparative advantage of GM farms versus non-GM farms is 
the central theme of the paper. Irreversibilities and uncertainties are modelled 
using a combined geometric Brownian motion and Poisson process. While the 
applicability using a combination of the two processes for finding an analytical 
solution seem to be limited, we discuss how proper calibration of the parameters 
allows to use a combination of the two processes for a number of problems. 
Contrary to previous papers (Soregaroli and Wesseler 2005; Beckmann et al. 
2006) we extend the model by considering transaction costs and illustrate how 
they affect the value of the technology. While previous studies addressing the 
coexistence issue have considered minimum distance requirements other 
regulations commonly found among the member states have largely been ignored. 
The framework we present can also find empirical application as illustrated in the 
example provided in section six of the work.  
We proceed as follows. In section two we define what we mean by 
coexistence. In section three we introduce ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability 
under irreversibility and uncertainty into the model. Section four discusses the 
implications of ex-ante regulations and ex-post liabilities for technology adoption, 
and regional agglomeration of adopting farms. Section five discusses the 
implications for policy analysis and in particular the link between technology 
adoption and minimum farm size. Section six presents an illustrative example from 
Germany demonstrating the relevance of the issues considered by the theoretical 
model. In section seven we conclude. 
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2  A Definition of Coexistence 
The problem of coexistence is a classical “problem of social costs” as pointed out 
by Beckmann and Wesseler (2007). Farmers who plant GM crops may cause 
negative (or positive) external effects to non-GM or organic farmers through 
pollen drift or other forms of admixture. The admixture, in principle, can be two 
sided. GM crops may affect non-GM crops but non-GM crops may also affect GM 
crops. It is important to note here that the same physical effect, i.e. pollen flow, 
can have different economic impacts, depending on the institutional setting. The 
institutional and regulatory setting defines the rules of what is or is not to be called 
GM. In the case of GM crops, this largely depends on threshold levels and crop 
specificities and therefore it is not surprising that the definition of the threshold is 
subject to a strong political debate (Nischwitz et al. 2004).3  
Drawing from Beckmann and Wesseler (2007), the coexistence value (vc) of 
GM farming - G - (non-GM farming - N -) of farm i, will be denoted by 
iG
vc?  
(
iN
vc? ) in case the GM farmer will be liable (l) for any harm caused by planting 
GM crops and by 
i
n
Gvc  ( i
n
Nvc ) in case the GM farmer will not be held liable (n). 
The interpretation of liability is that in the case where the GM farmer will be liable 
the property right is with the non-GM farmer, in the sense that the non-GM farmer 
has the right to produce non-GM crops and GM farmers have to take measure to 
protect that right and in the case where GM farmer are not liable they have the 
property right to plant GM crops and the non-GM farmer have to take appropriate 
measures. 
Coexistence can than be defined by:  
“A state described by a set of policies exogenous to the farmers that results in 
the planting of ‘organic and/or non-organic-non-GM’ and ‘GM crops’ at the same 
point in time in a pre-defined region with at least one farm i where 
i iG N
vc vc>? ?  
and one where 
i iG N
vc vc<? ?  under a non-GM-farmer property right system and at 
least one farm where 
i i
n n
G Nvc vc>  and one where i in nG Nvc vc<  under a GM-farmer 
property right system.” 
_________________________ 
3 In the EU the current food-labelling threshold is 0.9% for GM-food (Commission of the 
European Communities 2005). It should be noted here that for organic farming no 
threshold has been decided yet. The commission proposes a 0.9% threshold level as well, 
which is heavily debated. 
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For achieving the state of coexistence, regulators use a number of policies that 
can be classified in ex-ante regulations or ex-post liability rules. Those policies do 
affect the possibility of coexistence. However, it is not obvious to which extent 
coexistence policies will contribute to reaching the state of coexistence. In the 
following analysis we will assume that the property right is with the non-GM 
farmer, meaning to say s/he has the right to plant non-GM crops and farmers 
planting GM crops have to compensate and/or prevent damages to non-GM 
farmers. This system reflects the current situation in the EU. 
3 Ex-Ante Regulation and Ex-Post Liability 
3.1 Coexistence Value under Ex-Ante Regulation and Ex-Post 
Liability Rules 
The starting point is the definition of the GM farmer’s value function under ex-
ante regulation and ex-post liability rules. The value function of the GM farmer 
will be affected when complying with regulations; moreover, the possibility of 
facing ex-post liability for damages from cross pollination adds additional costs to 
those farmers that plant GM crops. The value of planting GM crops at farm i can 
be defined as the value from GM cultivation ( )iGv , i i iG G Gp y c− , with 
iG
p ,
iG
y ,
iG
c  as the respective farm level price, quantity and cost vectors, minus 
the costs related to liability and its control, λi. The coexistence value of GM 
farming of farm i under ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability is 
i iG G i
vc v λ= −? . [1] 
The expected costs related to liability are the sum of the costs of respecting ex-ante 
regulations, ri, and the value of expected ex-post tort liability tli: 
( )i i iE r tlλ = + . [2] 
The regulatory costs introduced in equation [2], ri, are the sum of the fencing and 
compensation costs under certainty. Following Kolstad et al. (1990) and Ewerhart 
and Schmitz (1998) expected ex-post tort liability, tli, can be written as 
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( )i i i itl d E jµ= ⋅ ⋅   [3] 
where, µi is the probability of causing an accident, in this case contamination of 
the neighbouring non-GM fields, di is the monetary value of the damage, and E(ji) 
is the expected probability that the injurer will pay the damages. In our case, E(ji), 
can be interpreted as a function of the court’s view and the probability of being 
sued by the neighbour who has suffered damage. From the previous equations the 
coexistence value function for the GM farmer, dropping the expectation operator 
to simplify notation, can be formulated as follows: 
( ) ( ), ( , ) , ( )
i iG G i i i i
vc v r s reg s reg d s reg j lawµ= − −?  [4] 
where s is the size of GM crops planted, reg is the enforced GM legal standard for 
the region (e.g. country or federal state) and law is the tort liability system of the 
region. 
Interpreting the variable reg as the minimum distance, z, one of the most 
common forms of ex-ante regulation, between the GM crop and the neighbouring 
non-GM crop we can write equation [1] as:  
( ) ( ), ( , ) , ( )
i iG G i i i i
vc v r s z s z d s z j lawµ= − −?  [5] 
Assuming 
iN
vc is not affected by GM farming (
i iN N
vc v= ) a profit 
maximizing farmer i would adopt a GM crop if the incremental benefit  
0
i i iG G N
vc vc v∆ ≡ − >? ? . 
3.2 Introducing Irreversibility and Uncertainty 
So far it was assumed that incremental benefits are certain and the farmer did not 
face reduced costs while deciding to adopt the GM technology. However, it could 
be the case that some of the costs are irreversible: for example, the GM crop 
requires specific machinery or the GM cultivation could make it difficult for the 
farmer to switch back to the non-GM status. These difficulties could include 
additional practices for the control of volunteers or a required minimum number of 
years of non-GM cultivation for a field to be considered for producing non-GM 
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products. While irreversibility aspects are not considered by policy makers as the 
ban on GM maize in France, Germany and Italy illustrates, they seem to be 
relevant for farmers. In Germany and Italy famers have sued the government for 
not having the right to plant GM maize. One of the major arguments for the 
German farmers was the expenses they had for the GM seeds they now were not 
allowed to be use. They further claimed irreversible environmental benefits of 
using Bt maize as well as the higher fodder value of BT maize by reducing 
mycotoxins. On the other hand, farmers have expressed reluctance of adopting GM 
oilseed rape, if they face regulations requiring a longer waiting period before they 
can grow non-GM oilseed rape as well as if neighbours have a negative attitude 
towards GM crops (Breustedt et al. 2008), both indicating irreversible adoption 
costs are part of the adoption decision. The multi-period time frame also adds 
uncertainty to the farmers’ adoption decision as future yields, prices and costs are 
not generally known with certainty.  
In the presence of net-irreversible costs, uncertainty and flexibility, the value 
of a GM crop is not simply the difference between the present value of future 
benefits and costs but the sum of this difference plus the value of the option to 
plant GM crops (Wesseler 2003). More formally, when some costs are irreversible, 
costs and benefits are uncertain and the decision to adopt can be postponed, a 
profit maximizing farmer maximizes the option value of the adoption possibility. 
Hence, we can write for the adoption decision under irreversibility and uncertainty 
excluding ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules, with ∼ indicating the value 
of co-existing under irreversibility and uncertainty: 
?( ) ( )max ( , ) ii i i i TG G G N iF vc E vc v v IR e ρ−⎡ ⎤∆ = ∆ −⎣ ⎦  [6] 
or including ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules: 
?( ) ( )( )max , , , ii i i i TG G G N i i iF vc E vc v v r tl IR e ρ−⎡ ⎤∆ = ∆ −⎣ ⎦? ? ?  [7] 
with IRi the net-irreversible costs excluding irreversible regulatory costs and iIR
?  
the net-irreversible costs including irreversible regulatory costs. 
There is some potential controversy about what we mean by net irreversible 
costs. IRi indicates the net-irreversible costs, the difference between irreversible 
costs Ii and irreversible benefits Ri, of farmers who adopt GM-crops. Both, Ii and 
 www.economics-ejournal.org 8 
Ri, are those at the private level and include sunk costs such as new machinery for 
higher density planting of herbicide tolerant soy beans or positive health benefits 
due to a change in pesticide use (Weaver and Wesseler 2004). iIR
?  indicates the 
net-irreversible costs under regulation and liability rules. iIR
?  includes in addition 
to IRi irreversible transaction cost, tciIR , that may arise due to negotiations with 
neighbouring farmers. Some of the transaction costs are assumed to be irreversible, 
as if farmers move out of planting GM crops, time and money spent on 
arrangements with neighbours to comply with and reduce regulatory and liability 
costs are worthless. 
tc
i i iIR IR IR= +?  [8] 
with 
0, 1,...,i i iIR I R i k= − > ∀ =  [8a] 
0, 1,...,tc tc tci i iIR I R i k= − > ∀ =  [8b] 
The uncertainty that in combination with the net irreversible cost creates the 
option value for adopting GM crops is represented by the following stochastic 
process: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i iG G G G id vc vc dt vc dz vc dqα σ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆? ? ? ?  [9] 
where 
i i iG G N i
vc v v r∆ = − −?  evolves under a combined geometric Brownian 
motion and Poisson process. α is the drift of the Brownian motion, dz is the 
increment of a Wiener process, dt is the marginal increment in time and dqi is the 
increment of a Poisson process. The first two terms on the right-hand-side of 
equation [9] are common for modelling incremental benefits of GM crops under 
irreversibility and uncertainty (e.g. Wesseler et al. 2007; Demont et al. 2004; 
Morel et al. 2003; Wesseler 2003). The drift rate α captures the exponential 
growth of the difference in revenues between GM and non-GM crops, the expected 
trend, and the variance rate σ deviations from the trend. The third term represents 
tort liability modelled as the risk of a jump in the profit when the farmer is held 
liable. More precisely, 
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tdz dtε= , and  
0 with probability 1- dt
- with probability dt
i
i
i i
dq
γ
φ γ
⎧= ⎨⎩
 [10] 
where εt is normally distributed with zero mean and unit standard deviation, γi is 
the mean arrival rate of a Poisson process, and φi the percentage of the ex-post 
liability costs of 
iG
vc∆ ? .  
From the above equation and the opportune boundary conditions the standard 
rule for the adoption decision under irreversibility and uncertainty, assuming φ = 
1, can be derived (Dixit and Pindyck 1994):4 
* 1
1
( )
1
i
i i
i
G G i i i ivc vc IR
β ρ α γβ
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∆ > ∆ = − +⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
? ? ?  [11] 
Equation [11] says adopt GM crops if the current incremental coexistence 
value of GM farming, 
i iG N
v v−  minus the regulatory costs ir , is greater than the 
hurdle value 
*
iG
vc⎡ ⎤∆⎣ ⎦? . This hurdle value depends among others on the regulatory 
and liability costs as they have an impact on the irreversible transaction costs and 
due to tort liability an impact on iγ . 
Please note, we get a farm specific hurdle rate, even if the drift and variance 
rate of the geometric Brownian motion are homogenous over all farms as the mean 
arrival rate of the Poisson process is farm specific and depends on the landscape 
and number and distance of non-GM farms in the neighbourhood. 
With the now specified decision rule of adopting GM crops considering ex-
ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs under irreversibility and uncertainty, we 
can have a closer look at the coexistence issue and regional agglomeration. 
_________________________ 
4φi is assumed to be one to derive an analytical solution. Using a different value for φi 
requires finding a solution numerically. 
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4 Adoption and Spatial Agglomeration Effects under 
Irreversibility and Uncertainty 
4.1 Adoption Effects 
To see the effects of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules on adoption and 
regional agglomeration we start by looking at the initial situation without any 
irreversibility and uncertainty as well as liability system. This situation is depicted 
in Figure 1. The horizontal axis illustrates the benefits for farmers staying non-GM 
and the vertical axis the benefits for becoming a GM-farmer. Point A1 indicates a 
situation where the incremental benefits from planting non-GM crops for farmer a 
are positive ( )a aN Gv v> , whereas at point B1 the incremental benefits from GM 
crops for farmer b are positive ( )b bG Nv v> . Under the assumption that b bG Nv v>  
and 
a aN G
v v>  the comparative advantage of the two farm is defined by 
( ) ( )1 b b a aG N N GC v v v v= − − −   [12a] 
This is represented by point C1 in Figure 1. As the incremental benefits of farmer b 
are larger than the incremental benefits of farmer a point C1 is above the 45°-
degree line indicating a comparative advantage for farmer b.  
The situation changes with the introduction of irreversibility and uncertainty. 
The term 1
1
( )
1
i
i
i i i iIR
βκ ρ αβ
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, representing the value of waiting, has an 
additive effect on the comparative advantage of the two farms: assuming 
;
b b a aG N N G
vc vc vc vc> > , 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
2
.
b b a a
b b a a
G N N G
G b N N G a
C vc vc vc vc
v v v vκ κ
= − − −
= − − − − −  [12b] 
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Figure 1. Distribution of adopter and non-adopters without net-irreversible costs and ex-
ante regulation and ex-post liability. 
As depicted in Figure 2, irreversibility and uncertainty at the production level 
have the following implications. Firstly, incremental benefits from GM-crops are 
reduced due to the irreversibility and uncertainty effect ( iκ ). This is illustrated by 
a vertical downward movement of farmer b from point B1 to point B2. If farmer a 
is not affected the new comparative advantage is at point 2 /w oC  which is still above 
the 45°-degree line. But it is also reasonable to assume that farmer a would face 
irreversibility and uncertainty as well if s/he would consider adopting GM crops 
(see equation [12b]). Hence, under irreversibility and uncertainty the benefits of 
farmer a for staying non-GM do increase. This is indicated by a horizontal move 
from point A1 to point A2. The new comparative advantage is indicated by point 
2
wC . This point is located below the 45°-degree line. Now, the comparative 
advantage has moved from GM farmer b to the non-GM farmer a. This effect is 
 
1 B*  
1A*  
,
a bN N
v v  
1C*  
,
a bG G
v v
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Figure 2. Distribution of adopter and non-adopters with net-irreversible production costs 
and without ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability. 
independent of ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs and has already been 
studied for the adoption of GM crops (e.g. Demont et al. 2004; Morrel et al. 2003; 
Scatasta et al. 2006). 
Now, if the GM farmer is liable for possible damages, the costs for complying 
with the regulations have influences on the iκ  term, including the hurdle rate and 
irreversible costs, that becomes ( )1
1 1
i
i
i i i i iIR
βκ ρ α γβ
⎛ ⎞= − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
? ? ; also, liability 
1B*  
1A*  
1C*  
2B*  
2A*  
2
/C* w o  
2C* w  
( )1
1 1
, bba b
b
G G b b IRv v
β ρ αβ− −−
( )1
1 1
,aaa b
a
N a a NIRv v
β ρ αβ −−+
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has an additive effect on the comparative advantage of the two farms: under the 
same assumptions of equation [12b], 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
3
.
b b a a
b b a a
G N N G
G b b N N G a a
C vc vc vc vc
v r v v v rκ κ
= − − −
= − − − − − − −? ?  [12c] 
The new situation is depicted in Figure 3. Again, we can observe two main 
effects. First, ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs increase the hurdle 
value of adoption. This is indicated by a downward vertical move from point B2 to 
point B3. Please note, planting GM crops is still profitable for farmer b. Second, 
the value of staying non-GM either remains the same or further increases. The 
benefits costs for staying non-GM will remain the same for farmer a, if s/he is 
surrounded by GM-farms only and coexistence policies require to keep a distance 
to, inform and compensate non-GM farmers for harm. In that case, if s/he also 
becomes a GM-farmer there are no additional regulatory and liability costs as there 
is no non-GM farm left. Farmer a remains at point A2. The comparative advantage 
for staying non-GM in this case is indicated by point 3 /w oC . In case there are other 
non-GM farmers in the neighbourhood switching to GM crops adds additional 
compliance costs for farmer a. Hence, the benefits of staying non-GM further 
increase as indicated by point A3. The comparative advantage for the non-GM 
farmer further increases as indicated by the move to the right from point 3 /w oC  to 
point 3wC . 
It is important to recognize, that liability increases the irreversible costs due to 
additional negotiation costs. Every unit of irreversible costs demands more than 
one unit of incremental benefits. Regulation and liability rules have two effects on 
potential adopters. First, regulations directly decrease the incremental benefits (see 
equation 7). The adoption rate would decrease even without ex-post liability. 
Second, ex-post liability increases iκ ? . In the appendix we show 
( )1
1
0
1
i
i
i i i i
β ρ α γ γβ
⎛ ⎞∂ − + ∂ >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
. This effect further increases the required 
incremental benefits for adoption. The coexistence policy implications will be 
discussed in more detail in section five. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of adopter and non-adopters with net-irreversible production costs 
under ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability. 
Figure 3 clearly shows that ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs for 
GM-farmers reduce the adoption of the technology and favours non-GM farming. 
The opposite can be shown to hold for providing the GM farmer with the property 
right of planting GM-crops. The effect can be explained by using Figure 2. If the 
fencing costs of the non-GM farmer are equivalent to the irreversibility effect at 
production level then farmer a would move back from point A2 to point A1. The 
comparative advantage in the case of the production right is with the GM-farmer 
and the point illustrating the situation is point 2 /w oC . 
3C* w  
3
/C* w o  
1B*  
1A*  
1C*  
2B*  
2A*  
2
/C* w o  
2C* w  
3A*  
3B*  
( )1
1 1
, b ba b
b
G G b b b bIRrv v
β ρ α γβ− −−− +
?
( )1
1 1
,a
a b
a
N a a a a a NIRrv v
β ρ α γβ −−+ + +
?
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legal barrier 
4.2 Agglomeration Effects 
The rules and regulations governing coexistence not only affect adoption directly, 
they also set incentives for the GM and non-GM farmer to collaborate with 
neighbours. Consider Figure 4 which is a comparison between the benefits and 
costs before and after the introduction of regulation and liability.  
The horizontal axis represents non-GM farms with 0
a aN G
v v− >  and the 
vertical axis GM farms with 0
b bG N
v v− > . Any point in the quadrant indicates the 
situation between a non-GM and GM farm. All points above (below) the 45°-
degree line indicate situation where the incremental benefits of the GM (non-GM) 
farmer are larger than the incremental benefits for the non-GM (GM) farmer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Agglomeration effects induced by ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability 
Three situations to adapt to ex ante regulations and ex post liability rules do 
exist. If the incremental benefits 
b bG N
ν ν−  for GM farmers are less than the costs 
to comply with the rules and regulation, they are below the legal barrier, they will 
not adopt the GM crop and become (or stay) non-GM farmers. This will be a likely 
situation for areas where the benefits from the technology are small and hence, 
0
a aN G
v v− >  
0
b bG N
v v− >  
GM farmer will switch to 
non-GM crops 
GM farmer 
will 
compensate 
non-GM 
farmer for 
not growing 
non-GM 
Coexistence
 
( )1
1 1
a
a
a a a a ar IR
β ρ α γβ+ − +−
?  
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potential adopters will stay non-GM. In those regions there will be no coexistence 
between GM and non-GM farmers. This is in Figure 4 the shaded area below the 
legal barrier. An excellent example is the voluntary GMO free zone in the 
Uckermark of Germany (Nischwitz et al. 2005). 
In those areas where the incremental benefits for GM farmers are above the 
legal barrier and the incremental benefits for the farmer staying non-GM are 
smaller than the incremental benefits for the GM farmer, GM farmers can 
compensate the non-GM farmers and convince them to become GM farmers as 
well. This is the left shaded area above the legal barrier in Figure 4. In those 
regions an agglomeration of GM farmers will happen and again there will be no 
coexistence between GM and non-GM farmers.  
The third situation resembles regions where GM as well as non-GM farmers 
show high incremental benefits. In those regions the incentives for the GM farmer 
is to grow the crops, comply with the regulations and in case of liability pay for 
the possible damage. The GM farmer has no economic incentive to compensate the 
neighbouring non-GM farmer to become a GM farmer. There is also no economic 
incentive in that situation to become a non-GM farmer. In this situation 
coexistence between GM and non-GM farmers will emerge. 
5 Implications for Policy Analysis 
The model presented in the previous sections allows to deal with the problem of 
coexistence in the context of policy assessment. Several policy tools and 
regulations can impact, directly or indirectly, on the variables of the model, 
therefore having an effect on GM-adoption and agglomeration of farms. Moreover, 
the model allows for heterogeneity of farms and it can possibly be extended to take 
into account for alternative distributions of farms’ characteristics. 
The variables that can be influenced by the policy and institutional 
environment are the costs of respecting ex-ante regulations (ri), the mean arrival 
rate of a Poisson process (γi), the percentage (φi) of the ex-post liability costs of 
iG
vc∆ ? , the net-irreversible costs under regulation and liability rules ( iIR? ), and 
directly the value of GM (
iG
v ) and non-GM cultivation (
iN
v ).  
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While the liability system applies ex-post, after harm has been done, ex-ante 
regulations are favoured by many EU member-states. The next paragraph 
illustrates the link between the parameters of the model and one particular form 
ex-ante regulation that deserves special attention: the minimum distance 
requirement between GM and non-GM farms. 
5.1 Minimum Distance Requirements, Farm Size and Adoption 
Minimum distance requirements are common instrument of coexistence policies 
among EU member states (Beckmann, Soregaroli, Wesseler 2006). Soregaroli and 
Wesseler (2005) show that assuming reasonable functional forms minimum 
distance requirements have two effects. On the one hand they increase the 
regulatory costs on the other hand they decrease the expected future liability costs. 
But minimum distance requirements do also induce a threshold affect. The 
minimum distance requirements do determine the minimum farm size needed for 
adoption. They also define for larger farms a minimum of area that needs to be set-
a-side for non-GM crops.  
From equation [11], the relationship between minimum adoption size s and 
minimum distance requirements z, with zo indicating the area for distance 
requirement, the threshold effect, can be found from the following 
* 1
1
( ) 0 if
1
otherwise
i
i
i
o
G i i i i
o
H vc IR s z
z
β ρ α γβ
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= ∆ − − + = >⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟−⎨ ⎝ ⎠⎪⎩
? ?
. 
As long as the minimum farm size is not greater than zo adoption will not be 
possible. This result is trivial but has already important implications for adoption. 
Ex-ante minimum distance requirements discriminate against smaller farms, farms 
with a size less than zo. This is not the only effect through which ex-ante minimum 
distance requirements discriminate against smaller farms. 
From the implicit function theorem it is possible to write for the case s>zo:  
H zs z
H s
∂ ∂∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂  
and applying this to H provides 
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[13] 
Given that at the break-even point of minimum size s an increase in the farm size 
implies a higher increase in the extra profits than in the extra ex-ante regulations 
and ex-post liability costs, the denominator of equation [13] can be considered to 
be positive around s and we can write: 
( )
?
( )
1
1
*
1
1
1
1
1
sign sign 
( )
1
1
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i i i
G i
i i i
i
i i i
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s z vc z IR
z
IR
z
β
β ρ α γ
β ρ α γ
β
β ρ α γβ
+
++
−
+
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ − +⎢ ⎥∂⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ = −∂ ∆ ∂ +⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞ ∂ − ++⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− ∂⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞ ∂+ − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− ∂⎝ ⎠
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?
??????????
???????
??????????
???????????
[14] 
Even if the sign for equation [14] is ambiguous, ex-ante minimum distance 
requirements do have a minimum farm size effect as can be seen by the last term. 
The two terms in the square brackets indicate the effect of an increase in minimum 
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distance requirements on ex-post liability cost. The first term is positive which can 
be explained by the positive effect of an increase in minimum distance 
requirements on future liability. The future value of the project increases and the 
value of waiting to adopt the technology does increase. The second term is 
negative and shows the effect of an increase in minimum distance requirements on 
the immediate benefits of adopting GMOs through a decrease in the actual 
discount rate ( )1 i i iρ α γ− + . Which effect dominates is not obvious (Soregaroli 
and Wesseler, 2005). For reasonable parameter values the overall effect of the two 
terms in square brackets is positive, the sign of equation [13] will be positive as 
well. Even if the sign of the square brackets is negative, irreversible cost do 
increase the minimum farm size for adoption. Only if 0iIR z
∂ =∂
?
 there might be 
no minimum farm size effect because of irreversible costs. 
5.2 Ex-post Liability Rules and Adoption 
iγ  and iφ  influence directly the value of expected ex-post tort liability. iγ  is a 
function of the legislation and the court view, so it is directly linked with the legal 
enforcement of the law in the territory, but also to the farmer’ characteristics and 
ex-ante actions to avoid liability (fencing and compensation costs). In the model 
presented, iγ  has a single value, but the modelling can be extended to consider a 
discrete or continuous distribution of the parameter to also accommodate for 
different values of iφ . Variations in iγ  can have a substantial influence on the 
comparative advantage of farms and on the results of regional agglomeration. In 
the appendix we show that an increase in iγ  increases iκ ?  and, hence reduces 
immediate adoption. In case of a legal system using joint and several liability in 
combination with strict liability as in the case for Germany the expected value of 
E(ji) will be much higher as in the case of strict liability for GM farmers only, such 
as in Poland or Ireland. The expected value of ex-post liability costs in this case 
will be higher as under a fault-based liability system such as in Denmark. The 
expected value of being sued, E(ji), can be expected to be even lower in countries 
where liability is based on the civil law such as in the Czech Republic. The 
differences in the ex-post liability costs can be explained by the differences in 
E(ji). The differences in E(ji) can be explained by the easiness of suing the GM 
farmer. 
 www.economics-ejournal.org 20 
6 An Illustrative Example: Brandenburg, Germany 
The state of Brandenburg is located in the eastern part of Germany. As in all of 
East Germany, Brandenburg is characterised by large scale farming. In 2005, 
6,669 farms cultivated 1.415 Million hectare of utilised agricultural area (UAA), 
of which 74% was arable land (Statistische Berichte 2006a). The average farm size 
was 200 hectare UAA, with 69% of the UAA cultivated in farms larger than 500 
hectare. In 2005 the total cultivation of maize was 116,500 hectare, the majority of 
94,000 hectare being green maize and 22,500 ha grain maize (Table 1). The share 
of maize in the arable land amounted to 11.1% (Statistische Berichte 2006b).  
Brandenburg shows a comparatively high share of organic agriculture. In 
2005, 9.8% of the UAA was cultivated as organic (Statistische Berichte 2006c). 
This share varies significantly from region to region. While the NUTS 35 region 
Dahme-Spreewald showed the highest share of organic agriculture with 29.3%, 
Elbe-Elster had the lowest with 2.1%. Compared to conventional farming, maize is 
less important in organic agriculture and only green maize is grown which 
amounts to 2,300 hectare in 2005 (1,97% of the total maize area grown in 
Brandenburg). The share of organic maize in the organic arable land amounts only 
to 2.58%. 
The European Corn Borer (ECB) is considered an important maize pest in 
Brandenburg. The problem is of great spatial heterogeneity. The eastern parts of 
Brandenburg are the mostly affected, in particular the area known as the 
Oderbruch (part of the NUTS 3 region Märkisch-Oderland). In the eastern parts of 
Brandenburg, the infestation frequency is estimated with 50% and above. In other 
parts of Brandenburg the infestation level is about 20% (Landtag Brandenburg 
2005). Some studies estimate the total maize area infected annually by the ECB in 
Brandenburg with 20,000 hectares, which is 17% of the total maize area cultivated 
in 2005 (Degenhart et al. 2003). 
_________________________ 
5 NUTS refers to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics a geocode standard 
developed by the EU for diving the EU in administrative divisions.  
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Table 1. Maize Cultivation in Brandenburg, 2005 
 Hectares Percent 
Total cultivated maize 116,500 100 
Green maize 94,000 80.69 
Grain maize 22,500 19.31 
Organic green maize 2,300 1.97 
Vulnerable to corn borer* 20,000 17.17 
Bt-maize 2005** 129 0.11 
Source: Statistische Berichte (2006b, c), * Degenhardt et al (2003), **Standortregister 
(2006) 
The German regulations for coexistence include mandatory registration of 
areas to be planted with GM crops 3–9 months before planting, following good 
agricultural practices for planting GM crops which includes a distance to 
neighbouring maize fields of 20 meters. Strict and joint and several liability 
applies in case the non-GM maize can not be marketed anymore due to 
adventitious presence of Bt-maize grain (Commission of the European 
Communities 2006) 
Since the Gentechnikgesetz (Bundesrat 2005), the German law regulating the 
planting of GM crops, has come into force in January 2005, Brandenburg has been 
the leading state in the cultivation of GM-crops and Bt-maize in particular. In 
2005, 341 ha of GM-crops have been planted in Germany, 129 hectares of them 
(i.e. 38%) in Brandenburg (Table 2). This share increased in 2006. From 951 
hectares GM-crops planted in Germany in 2006 447 (47%) hectares are planted in 
Brandenburg. The by far most important variety is Bt-maize MON-00810-6, which 
amounts to up to 99.5% of all GM-crops grown in Brandenburg. Some farms 
withdraw the registered area partly or totally (Table 3). In 2006, 11 notifications  
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Table 2. Cultivation of GM-crops in Brandenburg and Germany, 2005-2006 
 2005 2006 
 Hectares % Hectares % 
Germany 341.59 100 951.32 100 
Brandenburg 129.42 37.9 447.48 47.0 
Source: Standortregister, 26.06.2006 
Table 3. Cultivation of Bt-Maize MON-00810-6 in Brandenburg 
 2005 2006 
Notifications to grow Bt-maize, number 8 37 
Partly withdrawn notifications, number  4 11 
Totally withdrawn notifications, number n.a. 6 
Totally withdrawn notified Bt-maize area, 
hectare 
n.a. 180.52 
Cultivated Bt-maize area, hectares 128.69 446.66 
Average cultivated Bt-maize field size, 
hectares  
16,08 14.41 
Source: Standortregister, 26.06.2006 
were withdrawn with a notified area of about 180 hectare which is about one third 
of the totally announced area. Unfortunately, data on the area that was partly 
withdrawn does not exist in the GM-crop register. 
Märka, a regional grain trader, announced in 2005 to buy Bt-maize as well as 
non Bt-maize grown within a distance of 100 meters to Bt-maize areas at market 
price. The objectives were to signal to GM farmers that there is a market for their 
product as well as to non-GM farmer that they can sell their grain maize without a 
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down payment in case of adventitious presence of GM grain maize in the supposed 
to be non-GM grain maize. In combination with the relatively high ECB pressure 
and the large average farm size economic incentives for adopting Bt-maize are 
high. Degenhardt et al. calculate incremental benefits of 93€ per hectare for Bt-
maize in the Oderbruch region of Brandenburg. This amounts to an annual average 
incremental benefit of about 1340€ per Bt-maize growing farm. Despite this, only 
about 2.2% of the UAA for grain maize in Brandenburg has been planted with Bt-
maize in 2006. 
The model presented can explain the low adoption rate due to ex-ante 
regulatory and ex-post liability costs and the irreversibility effect. In the case 
presented the ex-ante regulatory costs can be considered to be low, as Märka’s 
policy actually controls for the distance requirements. Also, the actual ex-post 
liability costs are close to zero due to the promise by Märka to buy the harvest 
from neighbouring fields. Nevertheless, expected ex-post liability costs are high. 
Nischwitz et al. (2004) report results of a case study where the major reason of 
farmers who are voluntary members of a GM free zone6 (30% of the respondents) 
to become GM farmers, would be the removal of the risk of being held liable. In 
addition irreversible costs do exist in the form of getting acquainted with the 
German rules and regulations to be followed for planting Bt-maize. 
7 Conclusions 
The difference in incremental benefits and costs between GM and non-GM 
farmers provide incentives for regional agglomeration of either GM or non-GM 
farms. We show that the incremental benefits for becoming a GM farmer need to 
increase due to the irreversibility effect of the ex-ante regulations and ex-post 
liability rules compared to a situation without ex-ante regulations and ex-post 
liability rules. Minimum distance requirements between non-GM and GM farms 
increases the minimum farm size necessary for adopting the technology and 
therefore has a farm size effect as already pointed out by Beckmann (2005). The 
_________________________ 
6 Until December 2006, five GM-free zones have been established in Brandenburg 
associating 204 farmers and approximately 80.140 ha UAA, which amounts to 5.6% of the 
total UAA (GFR 2006). 
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irreversibility effect of ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules increase the 
costs of minimum distance policies and hence increase the minimum farm size for 
adoption. 
This has implications for empirical studies. Investigations assessing the 
potential adoption of GM crops need to consider the ex-ante regulations as well as 
ex-post liability regimes. Further, ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability regimes 
need to be differentiated between reversible and irreversible benefits and costs as 
they have a different effect on adoption. The model we have presented allows a 
ranking of different liability regimes as discussed in section 5.2 with respect to the 
implications on adoption. While the ranking is not surprising we provide a 
rationale, which so far has been missing (Koch 2008). 
The minimum distance requirements that many countries consider for or have 
already included in their coexistence policy discriminates against smaller farms. 
This has implications for the distribution of adopting farms. Areas with on average 
smaller farm sizes will experience lower rates of adoption and a reduction in their 
competitiveness. This discriminatory aspect of an ex-ante regulation has so-far not 
been considered within the literature on the effects of ex-ante regulations versus 
ex-post liability rules. A possible corner solution for those areas is either all 
farmers adopt the technology or none, and in the latter case, becoming a GM-free 
zone.  
The regulatory choice has also implications for the comparative advantage of 
farms as opportunity costs change. In Europe, where in many cases potential GM 
farmers face ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules increase the costs of 
adoption the comparative advantage of the GM farmer will be reduced. This has 
implications for the long run. In cases where comparative advantage is with the 
GM farmer, the GM GM farmer may out-compete the non-GM farmer. 
Coexistence policies can change the outcome. The welfare losses of such kind of 
policies are often not considered by decision makers but can be substantial 
(Wesseler 2009) and deserves further attention.  
The example of Brandenburg demonstrates that low adoption of an otherwise 
economical technology is a relevant issue and can be explained by using our 
model. The question to what extent ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability and the 
irreversibility effect do prevent the adoption of GM crops in Europe is an 
empirical one. We have provided with our analysis a theoretical framework that 
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can be used for such an empirical study. As Smyth and Kershen (2006) have 
pointed out such kind of model may not be limited to the case of GM crops only. 
Further, our results suggest a combination of ex-ante regulations and ex-post 
liability rules is superior over ex-ante regulations as precautionary measures only, 
except for the trivial case where ex-ante regulations are supposed to stop GM 
planting at all. This can be explained by the fact that ex-ante regulations of GM 
crop planting can not prevent harm by 100 per cent. On would expect farmers to 
endogeneize minimum distances given liability rules resulting in the demand for 
flexible ex-ante regulations as has been debated by Demont et al. (2009) and 
Desquilbert and Bullock (2009). Our model illustrates that ex-post liability rules 
for the GM farmer provides incentives for ex-ante distance keeping to non-GM 
farms to reduce ex-post liability costs.7 This point in more general has been 
discussed recently in detail by Shleifer (2010). Our model results support his 
argument despite having ex-post liability rules ex ante measures do emerge to 
reduce ex-post liability costs.  
_________________________ 
7 Reinforcing voluntary ex-ante measures might be hold-up problems arising if an 
agreement between neighbours has been made but not kept. If the GM farmer is liable he 
may want to reduce additional hold-up costs even so he may win his case at court as a 
contract has been breached. A similar reasoning applies of course for the non-GM farmer. 
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Appendix  
Proof of 0i iκ γ∂ ∂ >? .  
To improve the readability of the equations the following notation will be 
used: 
1
1
( )
1
i
i
i i i i iIR
βκ ρ α γβ
⎛ ⎞= − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
? ?  
( )2
1 2 2 2
21 1 1
2 2i
ii i
i i i
ρ γα αβ σ σ σ
+⎛ ⎞= − + − + >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
( )2 2
2 2
21
2
i ii
i i i
i i
q
ρ γαυ χσ σ
+⎡ ⎤= − + = +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
2
1
2
i
i
i
αχ σ
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
( )
2
2
0.i ii
i
q
ρ γ
σ
+= >  
Note: αi is the drift rate, σi2 the variance of a geometric Brownian motion, ρi the 
discount rate and γi the mean arrival rate of a Poisson process. i indicates the i-th 
farm. 
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Proof: 
( )1 1 1 2
1
0
1;
1
i i i
i
i i
i i i
i i i i
κ γ
β β βρ α γβ γ γ σ υ
∂ ∂ >
⎛ ⎞ ∂ ∂⇒ > − + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
?
 
Substituting 1 2
1i
i i i
β
γ σ υ
∂ =∂  provides 
( )1
2
1 1
i
i
i i i
i i
β ρ α γ
β σ υ
⎛ ⎞ − +>⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  [A1] 
Assuming 0iα ≥  the term 2 i
i i
α
σ υ  can be ignored and we get 
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( )
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1 1
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i i i
i i
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β ρ α γ
β σ υ
β ρ γ
β σ υ
β
β υ
υβ β
⎛ ⎞ − +>⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ +⇒ >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⇒ >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⇒ > −
 [A2] 
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Equation [A2] will be true, if 1i
iq
υ > . As 1i iυ χ> +  and 0.5i iq χ> +  
it follows 
2 2
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i
i i
i i
q
q
q
υ
υ
υ
>
⇒ >
⇒ >  
2 20.5 0.25i i i iχ χ χ χ⇒ + + > + + . ■ 
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